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Steven Plitt, Daniel Maldonado &John Wittwer?
INTRODUCTION
The insurance industry is much different today than it was when States first
enacted uninsured and underinsured offer/rejection statutes. The insurance agent's
role in selling insurance products to potential customers changed dramatically over
the years. Agents used to be a customer's only contact with the insurance industry
when purchasing a policy. "However, due to a maturing market's slower growth in
the property and casualty insurance areas, and the impact of increasing costs in
doing business through agents, insurance companies are now seeking new ways to
1 Steven Plitt is an Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law at the James E. Rogers College of Law,
University of Arizona where he teaches insurance law. He was a former Adjunct Law Professor at the
Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University where he taught the insurance law
curriculum. He is the current successor author to the nationally acclaimed insurance treatise, COUCH
ON INSURANCE 3D, where he and his team of associate authors are rewriting and revising the treatise
series. He is an author of several insurance law treatises. He is a nationally recognized expert on
insurance law. For more articles written by Mr. Plitt go to www.insuranceexpertplitt.com.
Daniel Maldonado is a partner at Maldonado & Associates, PLLC. Mr. Maldonado is an
author/editor for COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D and also a contributing author to several insurance law
treatises and articles. He was also the Articles Co-Chair for the DRI Insurance Law Committee
Advertising Injury and Personal Injury Subcommittee from 2013 to 2015.
John Wittwer is a member at The Cavanagh Law Firm in Phoenix, Arizona, where he practices in
the areas of insurance coverage and bad faith. Mr. Wittwer also serves on the Board of Directors of the
Arizona Association of Defense Counsel and is a member of the Arizona State Bar's Technology
Committee and its Subcommittee on Data and Privacy Security, Cyber-Liability and Related
Insurance.
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spur profitability."2 To address this slower growth, insurance companies sought
alternative, cheaper means to offer insurance policies to potential consumers,
including selling policies directly to consumers via the Internet or maintain national
call centers where consumers purchase a policy by utilizing toll-free telephone
numbers rather than a local insurance agent.' Today, the Internet and other new
technologies, as well as the modern "direct writer" business model, have gained
immense popularity. Large insurers began to increasingly use many different
channels to sell insurance. In the mid-to late-1990s businesses began offering
products on the Internet, and consumers were soon clamoring for online
functionality for their insurance needs.4 In a survey conducted around the year
2000, "45% of computer-owning households reported they rarely or never visited
an agent or broker in person.
" 5
With the continued growth of intemet-based and telephonic-based consumer
transactions, the need for the physical presence of a consumer with salesman during
the purchase transaction has rapidly diminished. Specifically, in the insurance
context, insurance companies have increasingly opted into using online or
telephonic insurance sales transactions rather than using independent and captive
insurance agents. 6 Consumers enjoy the benefit of quoting and issuing binding
insurance contracts within the boundaries of their own home. In light of
technological developments ariGing from the modem digital Internet era, Congrers
enacted the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act ("E-
SIGN") as an attempt to encourage the continued expansion of electronic
commerce and to clarify the legal status of electronic records and signatures.
7
E-SIGN generally gives legal effect to electronic records and electronic
signatures and puts them on equal footing with traditional paper records and
signatures. s Moreover, E-SIGN seeks to harmonize differing state laws on the
issue of electronic records and signatures by applying the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution to preempt state law provisions that deviated from the
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act ("UETA")9 and those provisions that were
2Deborah S. Freeman & Celia Eggert, Exploration of Polkyholder Information Ownership Rights
Under the Three Existing Insurance Agency Systems in the United States, 23 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
409, 409 (2002).
Id. ("In response, insurance companies have begun to provide consumers with additional access
points for sales, such as the Internet. They are also trying to expand their direct insurance sales through
toll-free telephone numbers.").
4 See Thomas P. Vartanian, Remote Banking and Financial Services, in 1 PRACTISING LAW
INSTITUTE, FOURTH ANNUAL INTERNET LAW INSTITUTE COURSE HANDBOOK 840-41 (2000)
[hereinafter Internet Law Institute].
I d. at 839.
6 Steven Plitt, Written Offers/Rejections in the Modern Age: Federal Preemption of State
Statutory Requirements in the New Digital Marketplace, FOR THE DEF., May 2008, at 43, 44.
7 See H.R REP. NO. 106-341(11), at 3 (1999); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-06 (2000). It was
Congress' intent for E-SIGN to apply to the business of insurance. Id. at § 7001(h)(i).
Id. at § 700 1(a).
UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS 1999). UETA is one of several uniform laws proposed by the National Conference of
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inconsistent with E-SIGN.' ° However, the enactment of E-SIGN has created
splits between courts in different jurisdictions, some of which have completely
disregarded E-SIGN's preemptive effect as the supreme federal law of the land.
As of 2014, forty-seven states, including all United States territories, have
adopted the UETA." While each respective state-adopted UETA statute
encourages electronic consumer transactions, the state-by-state inconsistencies of
defining an electronic record or a signature, coupled with federal-state preemption,
make these varying state statutes ripe for judicial adjudication as it applies to
particular insurance transactions, among others. For example, many states have
enacted uninsured ("UM") and underinsured ("UIM") written offer/rejection
requirements, and many states require an insurer to provide a "written offer notice"
of UM/UIM coverage to the insured. 2 UM/UIM written offer requirements
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), a non-profit unincorporated association comprised
of state commissioners on uniform laws from each State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. About the ULC, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION: NATL
CONF. COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM ST. LAWS,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?tile=About%20the%20ULC (last accessed Feb. 25, 2016).
'5 See 15 U.S.C. § 7002(a)(1) (2006); see also People v. McFarlan, 744 N.Y.S.2d 287, 292-95
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) (discussing the preemptive effect of E-SIGN over New York's Electronic
Signatures and Records Act, but fading to address the issue as the issue was not determinative of the
defendant's criminal case); Shea C. Meehan & D. Benjamin Beard, What Hath Congress Wrought: E-
SIGN, the UETA, and the Question of Preemption, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 389, 390 (2001); Renard
Francois, Comment, Fair Warning: Preemption and Navigating the Bermuda Triangle of E-SIGN,
U=TA, and State Digital Signature Laws, 19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 401, 413-15
(2001).
" See infra note 86 and Part Il.
12 See ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-259.01(A) & (B) (Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.)
(requiring an insurer to provide "written notice offer" of underinsured and uninsured motorist coverage
to the named insured); ARIC CODE. ANN. § 23-89-209(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.
and 2015 1st Ex. Sess.) (providing that private passenger automobile liability insurance cannot be sold
without the insured being offered the opportunity to purchase underinsured motorist coverage and
allowing written rejection of that coverage); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-4-609(2) (West, Wesdaw
through First Reg. Sess. 2015 Gen. Assemb.) (stating, "[b]efore the policy is issued or renewed, the
insurer shall offer the named insured the right to obtain uninsured motorist coverage in an amount equal
to the insured's bodily injury liability limits.") (emphasis added); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-
336(a)(1)(A) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. and June Spec. Sess.) (requiring automobile
liability insurance policies to include uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 18, § 3902(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 80 Laws 2015, ch. 193) (requiring the provision of
uninsured motorist coverage but allowing for the rejection of such coverage in writing); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 627.727(1) (West, Westlaw through ch. 232 (end) 2015 Reg. Sess. and Sp. A. Sess.) (requiring
uninsured motorist coverage in policies except when the insured has made written rejection of such
coverage for all insureds under the policy). But see Union Am. Ins. Co. v. Cabrera, 721 So. 2d 313, 314
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) ("The statute requires a written rejection. However, under the case law it is
also permissible for an insurer to avoid the statutorily required UM coverage if it proves that the named
insured orally waived the statutory requirement of a written rejection by knowingly selecting a lesser
limit or by knowingly rejecting UM coverage.") (emphasis added) (citations, quotations, and alterations
omitted); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ledford, 691 So. 2d 1164, 1168 n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
("[T]he company still has the right to prove 'that the named insured orally waived the statutory
requirement of a written rejection by knowingly selecting a lesser limit or by knowingly rejecting UM
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obligate insurance providers to make offers of coverage in writing to customers that
compensates for bodily injury in the event that an offending tortfeasor's insurance is
inadequate to cover this damage.' 3 Issues arise when the state's interpretation of a
written offer/rejection requirement conflicts with the federal definition of
electronic record or signature. A significant issue that has arisen is whether a
digitally recorded telephone conversation constitutes a written offer notice pursuant
to UETA or E-SIGN.
This article will discuss the significance of various states' UM/UIM written
notice requirements. In Part I, the authors will discuss how various states' notice
requirements also contain retention and attachment requirements. Part II will
discuss the rise of E-SIGN and how it directly applies within the insurance
context. In Part HI, the authors will discuss the numerous states that have enacted
a version of the UETA. The Arizona Court of Appeals and New Mexico Supreme
Court have confronted UM/UIM notice requirements as applied using electronic
means--specifically, whether a digitally recorded telephone conversation
constitutes written notice (Arizona)'4 and whether a drop down menu on a
webpage offering an insured UM/UIM coverage constitutes written notice (New
Mexico).' 5 These examples are addressed in Part IV. A thorough discussion and
analysis of E-SIGN as applied to insurance UM/UIM written notice requirements
is found in Part V. This section addresses why courts should enforce digital
telephonic recordings of UM/UIM offerings and why these telephonic recordings
comply with both E-SIGN and UETA. Lastly, the authors conclude by
summarizing the important role E-SIGN and the UETA play in the insurance
context around the United States.
I. JURISDICTIONAL SURVEY OF UM/UIM NOTICE REQUIREMENT
The thorny interplay between E-SIGN and state insurance regulations is
further complicated, in part, by the lack of uniformity in state UM/UIM "written
notice" requirements. There are four variations of offering requirements for
UM/UIM coverage: (1) mandatory inclusion of UM/UIM in the policy; (2)
mandatory inclusion of UM or UIM coverage unless specifically rejected; (3) no
obligation to offer UM coverage; and (4) mandatory offering. Those jurisdictions
where UM/UIM is mandatorily included in the policy include: Illinois, 6 Kansas,' 7
Minnesota, 8 Missouri,' 9 New York,20 North Dakota,21 South Carolina, 22 and
coverage.' (quoting Chmieloski v. Natl Union Fire Ins. Co., 563 So. 2d 164, 166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1990)) (emphasis added).
13 What Does Uninsured Motorist Protection Typically Cover?, ALLSTATE.COM (Feb. 2013),
https://www.allstate.com/tools-and-resources/car-insurance/uninsured-motorist-protection.aspx.
" Arizona-Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Palomera-Ruiz, 231 P.3d 384 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010).
"Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 245 P.3d 1214 (N.M. 2010).
'6 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/143a (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-495 2015 Reg. Sess.).
'7 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-284(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
'8 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65B.49, subdiv. 1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Spec. Sess.).
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Wisconsin. 23 Those jurisdictions that mandatorily require the inclusion of UM
and/or UIM coverage unless specifically rejected include: Alabama, 24 Indiana,25
Kentucky,26  Montana, 27  New Mexico,2" Oklahoma,29  Pennsylvania,3" and
Wyoming.3' Those jurisdictions where there is no obligation to offer UM/UIM
coverage include Michigan 32 and Ohio.33 There are some jurisdictions where a
mandatory offer of UM/UIM coverage must be made, including: Arizona,
3 4
19 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 379.203(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Veto Sess.). But cE. Long v.
Shelter Ins. Cos., 351 S.W.3d 692, 696 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (indicating that UIM coverage is non-
mandatory).
20 N.Y. INS. LAW § 3420(f)(1) (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2015).
21 N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 26.1-40-15.2(1) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 484 (end) of the 2015
Reg. Sess.)
22 S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-150(A) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).
23 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 632.32(4) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 60).
24 ALA. CODE § 32-7-23(a) (Westlaw through Act 2015-559 of 2015 Reg., First, and Second
Spec. Sess.).
2- IND. CODE ANN. § 27-7-5-2(a)-(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess.).
26 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.20-020, .39-050(2), .39-320(2) (West, Westlaw through the end
of the 2015 Reg. Ses.) (requiring UM must be provided in amount of minimum statutory limit unless
rejected in writing by insured, while UIM coverage does not have to be offered and must only be
provided if requested).
27 MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-23-201(1) & (2) (West, Westlaw through the 2015 Sess.) (requiring
that UM must be provided in amount of minimum statutory limit up to maxdmum amounts equal to
liability limits unless rejected in writing); Stutzman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 945 P.2d 32, 37 (Mont.
1997) (noting that [JIM coverage is optional under the Montana Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility
Act).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-301 (West, Westlaw through the end of the First Spec. Sess. of the
52nd Leg. (2015)) (requiring LIM and UTIM to be provided in amount of minimum statutory limit up to
maximum amounts equal to liability limits unless rejected in writing).
29 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3636(AHC), (G) (West, Westlaw through Chapter 399 (end) of
the First Sess. of the 55th Leg. (2015)) (requiring UM/UIM must be provided in amount of minimum
statutory limit and offered up to the maximum amounts equal to the liability limits unless rejected in
writing by the insured).
10 75 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. §§ 1731(a)-(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. Acts 1
to 51) (requiring mandatory offer of stantorily determined sums unless rejected in writing); id, at §
1734 (allowing for lower limits of coverage).
31 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-10-101 (West, Westlaw through the 2015 Gen. Sess.) (requiring UIM
must be provided in amount of minimum statutory limit unless rejected by the insured-there are no
similar UIM requirements).
32 Michigan courts have held that "[s]ince the repeal of M.C.L.A. § 500.3010; M.S.A. § 24.13010,
by 1972 P.A. 345, an insurer ic not required to provide (or a motorist to have) a statutorily mandated
minimum amount of uninsured motorist coverage." Gardner v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 266 N.W.2d 474,
475 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978).
31 OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(A) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Files 1 to 29 of the 131st
Gen. Assemb. (2015-2016) and 2015 State Issues 1 and 2).
3 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-259.01(A)-(B) (Westlaw through the First Reg. Session of the
Fifty-Second Leg.) (requiring that insurers offer UM/UIM coverage equal to liability limits of policy
but providing that insured is free to reject).
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Arkansas,35 Colorado,3 6 Florida,37 Idaho,3" Illinois, 31 Iowa,4° South Carolina,4
Utah,42 and Wisconsin.'
An invalid rejection may result in differing legal consequences depending on
the jurisdiction. In some states, for example, an invalid rejection results in
UM/UIM coverage being imputed into the policy at the amount of the statutory
minimum liability coverage required by the state's Financial Responsibility Act.
Those states that require an imputation of the statutory minimum of UM/UIM
coverage include: Alabama,"4 Arkansas, 45 Iowa,46 Kentucky,47 and Oklahoma.' In
other states, an invalid rejection results in imputation of UM_/UIM limits up to the
bodily injury limits of the policy selected by the named insured even if it is higher
than the statutory minimum. The states that impute the bodily injury limit to
UM/UIM coverage include: Arizona,49 Florida,"0 Illinois,5 Indiana, 2 Kansas, 3
Pennsylvania, 54 and South Carolina.
5 5
31 ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-89-403(a)(1)-(2) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. And 2015 1st
Ex. Sess. of the 90th Arkansas General Assemb.) (requiring the inclusion of UM in amount equal to the
minimum statutory limit, but allowing rejection in writing).
36 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-4-609 (West, Westlaw through the First Reg. Sess. of the 70th
Gen. Assemb.) (requiring UM/UIM to be offered before an insurance policy is issued or renewed in
amount no less than the statutory minimum and no more than the insured's bodily injury liability
limits).
17 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.727(1) (West, Westlaw through the 2015 1st Reg. Sess. And Spec. A
Sess. of the Twenty-Fourth Leg.) (requiring mandatory inclusion in amount of statutory minimum).
'8 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-2502 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2015 First Reg. and First
Ex. Sess. of the 63rd Leg.) (requiring the inclusion of a statutory minimum of UM/UIM coverage).
1 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/7-203 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-484 of the 2015 Reg.
Sess.) (requiring UM coverage equal to liability limits and UIM coverage equal to UM limit), 215 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/143a(2)(i) (West, Wesdaw through P.A. 99-484 of the 2015 Reg. Sess.).
4o IOWA CODE ANN. § 516A.1 (West, Westlaw through end of the 2015 Reg. Sess.) (requiring
UM coverage of minimum statutory amount).
41 S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-160 (West, Westlaw through End of 2015 Reg. Sess.) (requiring an
offer of UM and UIM coverage up to limits of liability coverage).
42 UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-302 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Spec. Sess.) (requiring a
mandatory UMIUIM coverage to statutory minimum).43 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 632.32(4m) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 60).
" State Farm Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reaves, 292 So. 2d 95, 100 (Ala. 1974) ("[W]here an exclusion in a
policy is more restrictive than the Uninsured Motorist Statute .... the statute requiring coverage
become a part of every policy as an implied term as if it were written out in fidl in the policy itself.").
4 See Colonia Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 924 S.W.2d 808, 810, 813 (Ark. 1996)
(refusing to impute underinsured motorist coverage because the insured had previously and correctly
rejected such coverage).
4 Rodish v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 514, 515 (Iowa 1993) (noting that the
provisions concerning uninsured and underinsured motorist insurance "part of all automobile insurance
policies" and thus imputing such coverage).
" Progressive N. Ins. Co. v. Corder, 15 S.W.3d 381, 384 (Ky. 2000) (imputing insurance for the
minimum statutory limit where loss caused by fraud on the part of the insured ig borne by an innocent
third party or by an insurance company).
"See Moon v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 764 P.2d 1331, 1334, 1337 (Okla. 1988) (finding rejection of
uninsurcd motorist improper and thus holding that coverage was still includcd within the contract).
4" Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Santa Cruz, 800 P.2d 585, 587-88 (Ariz. 1990).
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There are also various legal consequences if the insurer does not offer
UM/UIM coverage in the first instance. For example, UM/UIM statutes or
corresponding case law may create such UM/UIM coverage in the policy by
operation of law. 6 A majority of jurisdictions explicitly require through their
UM/UIM statutes or through judicial interpretation of such statutes that the
insured reject UM and/or UIM coverage in writing.57 Thirty-two states require that
o See Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Beaver, 355 So. 2d 441, 443 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(holding that UM coverage is included unless correctly rejected).
51 Wood v. Nat'l Liab. & Fire Ins. Co., 755 N.E.2d 1044, 1047 (1L. App. Ct. 2001) ("It logically
follows that, if the insurer does not obtain the UM/UIM rejection at the time the policy issued, the
UM/UIM limits must equal the bodily injury liability limits").
" See Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 775 N.E.2d 1198, 1206 (In& Ct.
App. 2002).
51 See Larson v. Bath, 801 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990).
5' Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co v. Irex Corp., 713 A.2d 1145, 1150-51 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (noting
that because rejection was not valid under Pennsylvania's UM/UIM statute, rejection was void-and
UM/UIM coverage must be provided equal to the bodily injury liability limits set forth in the policy.
s Butler v. Unisun Ins. Co., 475 S.E.2d 758, 760 (S.C. 1996).
56 Ormsbee v. Allstate Ins. Co., 859 P.2d 732, 736 (Ariz. 1993); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Santa Cruz,
800 P.2d 585, 588-89 (Ariz. 1990); Addie v. Linville, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80547, 80916, 2002-
Ohio-5333, at 44-46, afld, 798 N.E.2d 1077 (Ohio 2003); Moon v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 764 P.2d
1331, 1335 (Okla. 1988); Savage v. Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 970 P.2d 695, 699 (Or. Ct. App. 1999);
Burch v. S.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 569 S.E.2d 400, 402 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002); Bias v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 365 S.E.2d 789, 791 (W. Va. 1987); see Davidson v. Motorists Mut. Ins.
Co., 744 N.E.2d 713, 715 (Ohio 2001) (stating in dicta that "[i]f UMIUIM coverage is not offered, it
becomes part of the policy by operation of law"); see also Balagtas v. Bishop, 910 N.E.2d 789, 795 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2009).
57 Alabama: ALA. CODE § 32-7-23(a) (Westlaw through Act 2016-335 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.);
Progressive Specialty Ins. Co. v. Naramore, 950 So. 2d 1138, 1141-42 (Ala. 2006) (holding that named
insured's rejection of coverage in writing is valid); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Thomas, 337 So. 2d 365, 369
(Ala. 1976) (holding that oral rejection of UM coverage invalid because Commissioner of Insurance
required written rejection). California: CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 14 of
2016 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 8 of 2015-2016 2nd. Extraordinary Sess.). Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-
4-609(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through Apr. 22, 2016 of Second Reg. Sess. of 70th Gen. Assem.); State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Kasner, 77 P.3d 1256, 1260 (Colo. 2003) (en banc). Delaware: Humm v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 656 A.2d 712, 714-16 (Del. 1995). Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.727
(West, Westlaw through 2016 2nd Reg. Sess. of 24th Leg.); Harris v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 569
F.2d 850, 851 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting that Florida Department of Insurance regulation requires written
rejection). Idaho: IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-2502 (West, Westlaw through ch. 47 of 2016 Second Reg.
Sess. of the 63rd Leg.). Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-284 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.);
Loucks v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 101 P.3d 1271, 1276 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004). Mississippi: Stevens
v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 345 So. 2d 1041, 1043 (Miss. 1977) (citing U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Gough,
289 So. 2d 925 (Miss. 1974)) (noting that terms of UM statute written into every policy unless rejected
in writing by insured). New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-301 (West, Westlaw through Second
Reg. Sess. of 52nd Leg.); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jameson, 472 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1280-85
(D.N.M. 2006) (noting that regulation also requires that insurer include written rejection in policy as a
reminder to insured); N.M. CODE R §13.12.3.9 (LexisNexis, LEXIS through New Mexico Reg.,
Volume 27, No. 8, dated Apr. 30, 2016). North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-279.21 (West,
Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. and 2016-3 of the 2016 Extra Sess.); Hendrickson v. Lee, 459 S.E.2d
275, 279 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that rejection of insured was invalid because it was not made
on a form promulgated by the Commissioner of Insurance). Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §
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the insured affirmatively reject UMIUIM coverage in writing for the rejection to be
valid.58 Nine states require an insurer to make a written offer of UM/UIM
3636 (West, Westlaw through ch. 309 of Second Reg. Sess. of 55th Leg.); Tuer v. Shallcross, 886 P.2d
481, 484 (Okla. 1994). Rhode Island. 27 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-7-2.1 (West, Westlaw through ch. 12
of the Jan. 2016 Sess.). Tennessee: TENN. CODE. ANN. § 56-7-1201 (West, Westlaw through 2016
Reg. Sess.); Integrity Ins. Co. v. Dudney, 745 F. Supp. 1299, 1311 (M.D. Tenn. 1990). Texas: TEX.
INS. CODE ANN. art.1952.101 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. of 84th Leg.); Howard v. INA
Cry. Mut. Ins. Co., 933 S.W.2d 212, 218-20 (Tex. App. 1996). Washington: WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 48.22.030 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. and Special Sess. and Laws 2016, chs. 1 and 2);
Clements v. Travelers Indem. Co., 850 P.2d 1298, 1301-02, 1304-06 (Wash. 1993) (en banc).
5' Alabama: ALA. CODE § 32-7-23(a) (Westlaw through Act 2015-520 of the 2015 Reg. and 1st
Spec. Ses.) (emphasis added); Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 776 So. 2d 81, 83 (Ala.
2000) ("To be legally effective, the named insured's rejection must be in writing.") (emphasis added);
Thomas, 337 So. 2d at 369 ("Eagle's purported verbal rejection prior to executing the policy, and not
evidenced by a writing contained in or coordinate with the policy, is invalid.") (emphasis added); see also
Naramore, 950 So. 2d at 1142 ("Alabama's uninsured-motorist statute, § 32-7-23(a), Ala. Code 1975,
provides that 'the named insured shall have the right to reject [uninsured/underinsured-motorist]
coverage' in writing.") (emphasis added).
Alaska: ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 21.89.020(e), 28.22.201(a)(3), 28.20.445(e) (West, Westlaw
through the 2015 1st Reg. Sess. and Second Spec. Sess. of the 29th Leg.).
Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-89-403(a)(2), -209(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg.
Sess. and 2015 1st Ex. Sess. of the 90th Arkansas Gen. Assembly).
California: CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (West, Westlaw through urgency legislation through Ch.
807 of the 2015 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 of the 2015-16 2nd Ex. Sess.); see also Smith v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399, 406 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) ("Section 11580.2, subdivision (a),
thus authorizes three-and only three-means by which uninsured motorist coverage can be entirely
waived, deleted, or modified and mandates the specific language that is to be used in any written
agreement providing for such waiver or modification.") (emphasis added); Dufresne v. Elite Ins. Co.,
103 Cal. Rptr. 347, 350-53 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that UM coverage was not "effectively
deleted by agreement set out in application form" and signed by someone in broker's office "on behalf of
insured pursuant to oral authorization," where insured had never seen purported deletion agreement or
been apprised of its terms (emphasis added)). It is important to note that under California's UM/UIM
statute, "[a]n uninsured motor vehicle includes an underinsured motor vehicle." CAL. INS. CODE §
11580.2(a)(2) (Wesdaw).
Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-4-609(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through the First Reg. Sess.
of the 70th Gen. Assembly).
Connecticut. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-336(a)(2) (West, Wesdaw current with
enactments from the 2015 Reg. Sess. and the June Spec. Sess.).
Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3902(a)(1) (West, Wesdaw through 80 Laws 2015, ch.
193).
Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.727(1) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 232 (End) of the 2015 First
Reg. Sess. and Sp. A Sess. of the Twenty-Fourth Leg.). But see Union Am. Ins. Co. v. Cabrera, 721
So. 2d 313, 314 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) ("The statute requires a written rejection .... However,
under the case law it is also permissible for an insurer to 'avoid the statutorily required [UM] coverage if
it proves that the named insured orally waived the statutory requirement of a written rejection by
knowingly selecting a lesser limit or by knowingly rejecting UM coverage.'") (emphasis added) (quoting
Chmieloski v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 563 So. 2d 164, 166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Ledford, 691 So. 2d 1164, 1166 n.3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) ("[T]he company still has the
right to prove 'that the named insured orally waived the statutory requirement of a written rejection by
knowingly selecting a lesser limit or by knowingly rejecting UM coverage.' (emphasis added) (quoting
Chmieloski v. Natl Union Fire Ins. Co., 563 So. 2d 164, 166 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)); Teachers Ins.
Co. v. Bollman, 617 So. 2d 817, 818 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that insured knowingly
rejected stacked uninsured motorist coverage where insured, after discussing rates for stacked uninsured
1Vol. 104
2015-2016] Federal Reverse Preemption of Uninsured and 383
Underinsured Motorist Offering in the Digital Age
motorist coverage with her agent, directed memorandum to agent instructing him to change automobile
policies from stacked coverage to unstacked coverage "as discussed last week on the telephone," even
though written rejection was not on statutorily prescribed form).
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 33-7-11(a)(3), (b)(1)(D)(ii) (West, Wesdaw through the Reg. Sess. of
the 2015 Legis. Sess.); Nolley v. Md. Cas. Ins. Co., 476 S.E.2d 622, 625 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)
("Uninsured/underinsured motorist insurance is not mandatory and therefore can be waived or rejected
in writing by the insured to the insurer.") (emphasis added).
Hawaii: FlAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 431:10C-301 (West, Westlaw through Act 243 [End] of the
2015 Reg. Sess.).
Idaho: IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-2502(2) (West, Westlaw through end of the 2015 First Reg. and
First Ex. Sess. of the 63rd Leg.). The Idaho Legislature sought to amend the Idaho UM/UIM statute.
The Idaho house bill's statement of purpose provides the following-
This legislation amends Idaho Code (41-2502 and 41-2503) to define the term
"underinsured motorist coverage" and require that certain motor vehicle liability insurance
policies issued in Idaho include underinsured motorist coverage. This legislation also allows a
named insured to reject, in writing or electronically, undeinsured motorist coverage. Finally,
this proposal will require the insurance carrier to provide the named insured a summary
statement, approved by the Director of the Idaho Department of Insurance, explaining
uninsured and undeinsured motorist coverages and different forms of underinsured motorist
coverage offered by insurers in Idaho.
H.B. 429, 59th Leg., Second Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2008); see also Letter from William W. Deal, Dir.,
State of Idaho Dep't of Ins., New Requirements for Underinsured Motorist Coverage for Mlotor
Vehicle Liability Policies-Idaho Code § 41-2502, (July 24, 2008),
http://www.doi.idaho.gov/laws/08_08.pdf. (setting forth standard statement promulgated by
Department of Insurance pursuant to Idaho Code Ann. § 41-2502(3)).
Illinois: 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/143a-2 (West, Wesflaw through P.A. 99-482, with the
exception of P.A. 99-480, of the 2015 Reg. Sess.).
Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 27-7-5-2 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First Reg. Sess. of the 119th
Gen. Assembly legis.).
Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. § 516A.1 (West, Westlaw through end of the 2015 Reg. Sess.).
Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-284(c) (West, Westlaw through laws enacted during the 2015
Reg. Sess. of the Kansas Leg.).
Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.20-020(1) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2015
Reg. Sess.)
Louisiana: See LA. STAT. ANN. § 22:1295(1)(b) (Westlaw through the 2014 Reg. Sess.);
Horstmann v. Drake, 420 So. 2d 473, 474-75 (La. Ct. App. 1982) ("We therefore conclude the
testimony offered by Continental to show a verbal agreement to purchase less uninsured motorist
coverage would be immaterial.") (emphasis added).
Maine: ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-a, § 2902(2) (Westlaw through the 2015 First Reg. Sess. of
the 127th Leg.).
Maryland: MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 19-510 (West, Westlaw through the 2015 Reg. Sess. of the
Gen. Assemb.) (including UIM within "UM"). It is important to note that "UM" includes UIM. Id. §
19-509.
Nevada: See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 690B.020(1) (West, Westlaw through June 30, 2015).
New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 264:15() (Westlaw through Chapter 276 (End) of the
2015 Reg. Sess.).
New Jersey, See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-23(e) (West, Westlaw through L.2015, ch. 115 and J.R.
No. 7) (providing that written rejection is "prima facie evidence of the named insured's ... rejection").
Unlike UM coverage, however, there is no mandatory floor for UIM coverage, and "an insurer need only
offer UIM coverage as an option to the named insured." Selective Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hojnoski, 722
A.2d 118, 121 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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coverage. 9 Seventeen states require the use of a special form or other specific visual
requirement in the context of an offer and/or rejection of UM/UIM coverage.'
New Mexico: Marckstadt v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 228 P.3d 462, 464-65, 467-70, 474 (N.M.
2009); see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-301(C) (West, Wesdaw through the end of the First Spec. Sess.
of the 52nd Leg.).
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3636(G) (West, Westlaw through Chapter 399 (End) of
the First Sess. of the 55th Leg.).
Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 742.502(2)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. legis. eff.
10/5/15).
Pennsylvania: 75 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1731(b)-(c) (West, Westlaw through 2015
Reg. Sess. Acts 1 to 49).
Rhode Island. 27 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 27-7-2.1(b) (West, Westlaw through chapter 285 of the
Jan. 2015 Sess.).
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-7-1201(a)(2), -1201(h) (West, Westlaw through end of the
2015 First Reg. Sess.).
Texas: TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1952.101(c) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2015 Reg.
Sess. of the 84th Leg.); see also Howard, 933 S.W.2d at 215-20 ("Because every policy of insurance in
this State, absent a written rejection, includes UM/UIM coverage by operation of law, that result ensues
without regard to the intent of parties to insurance contract."); Emp'rs Cas. Co. v. Sloan, 565 S.W.2d
580, 583-84 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) ("[W]e conclude that an oral rejection was ineffective to preclude
uninsured motorist coverage.") (emphasis added).
Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31a-22-305(5)(a), -305.3(3) (West, Westlaw through 2015 First
Spec. Sess.).
Washington: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.22.030(4), (10) (West, Westlaw through the 2015
Reg. Sess. and 2015 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Spec. Sess.).
West Virginia: See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-31d(a) (West, Westlaw through the 2015 Reg.
Scss.).
" These states include: Arizona, Maryland, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, South
Carolina, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-259.01(AHB)
(Westlaw through the First Reg. Sess. of the Fifty-Second Leg.); Matyland: § 19-510(c) (Westlaw).
Again, it is important to note that "UM" includes UIM. Id. at § 509. Nevada: See NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 687B.145(2) (West, Westlaw through all 2015 legis. effective through June 30, 2015); New
Jersey NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:28-1.1, -1.9, 39:6A-23 (West, Westlaw through L.2015, c. 120, J.RI
No. 7); New York: N.Y. INS. LAW § 3420(f)(2)(A)-(B) (West, Westlaw through L.2016, chapter 1);
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 60-2.3 (Westlaw changes received from the New York B.
Drafting Commission through May 27, 2016). North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-
279.21(m) (West, Westlaw through Chapter 266 of the 2015 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.); see
generally Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Burgdoff, 698 S.E.2d 500 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that
summary judgment was inappropriate because the determination of whether the written offer
requirements of North Carolina law had been met in such a cuse was a queation best suited for a jury);
South Carolina: See S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-160 (LEXIS through 2014 session); S.C. CODE ANN. §
38-77-350(A)-(B) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Act No. 138); but see Grinnell Corp. v. Wood, 698
S.E.2d 796, 798-99 (S.C. 2010) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wannamaker, 354 S.E.2d
555 (S.C. 1987) ("[I]nsurer's notification process must be commercially reasonably, whether oral or in
writing.")); Ray v. Austin, 698 S.E.2d 208, 212 (S.C. 2010), (holding that failure to comply with § 38-
77-350(A) does not automatically require judicial reformation of a policy and citing the Wannamaker
test); West Virginia: See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-31d (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.);
Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. ANN. § 632.32(4)(d), (4m)(b)-(d) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 60).
' These states include: Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Nevada, New
Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia,
and West Virginia. CONN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-336(a)(2) (Westlaw); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.727(1)
(Westlaw); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431:10C-301 (Westlaw); LA. STAT. ANN. § 22:1295(1)(a)
(Westlaw); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-a, § 2902(2) (Westlaw); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 19-510(d)
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Ten states require the insured's signature to effectuate the choice of coverage. 61 So
far, only three states (Florida, Mississippi, and South Carolina) have allowed oral
waiver of their statutory "writing" requirements for UM/UIM offer and/or
rejection.62
IH. THE ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN GLOBAL
AND NATIONAL COMMERCE ACT
In 1999, Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,63 which eliminated
significant barriers that had previously prevented banks from engaging in insurance
activities. 64 Commentators speculated after the passage of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act that the insurance industry was "under assault" from banks and other
segments of the financial services industry.65 This competitive pressure, along with
the growth of the Internet, "undermine[d] the role of the independent agents that
previously were responsible for the delivery of much of the insurance products sold
in America."' Consequently, many insurers began shifting from an "agency"
business model to a "direct writer" model.67 Direct writers are insurance companies
(Westlaw); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 690B.020(1) (Westlaw); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 39-6A-23
(Westlaw); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3636(G) (Westlaw); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 742.502
(Westlaw); 75 PA_ STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1731 (Westlaw); 27 RI. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 27-
7-2.1(a) (Westlaw); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-1201(a)(2), (h) (Westlaw); UTAH CODE ANN. §§
31a-22-305(5)(a), -305.3(3) (Westlaw); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-2206, -2202 (West, Westlaw
through End of the 2015 Reg. Sess.); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-31d (Westlaw).
61 These states include: Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Utah, and West Virginia. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-336 (Westlaw); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 431:10C-301 (Westlaw); IOWA CODE ANN. § 516A.1 (West, Westlaw through end of
the 2015 Reg. Sess.); LA. STAT. ANN. § 22:1295(1) (Westlaw); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-23
(Westlaw); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 742.502(2)(b) (Westlaw); 75 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1731 (Westlaw); 27 R-I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 27-7-2.1(a) (Westlaw); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31a-22-
305(4)(a), -305.3(3) (Westlaw); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-31d (Westlaw).
' Florida: See Union Am. Ins. Co., 721 So. 2d at 314; LibertyMut. Ins. Co., 691 So. 2d at 1166
n.3; Chmieloski, 563 So. 2d at 166. Mississippi: Stringer v. Bufkin, 465 So. 2d 331, 334 (Miss. 1985).
South Carolina: Ginnell Corp., 698 S.E.2d at 798-99 (citing Wannamaker, 354 S.E.2d 555); accord
Ray, 698 S.E.2d at 212.
' Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in
scattered sections 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
'4 See Thomas Lee Hazen, Relation of Securities Laws to Other Laws, in FUNDAMENTALS OF
SECURITIES LAW (2007), LEXIS SM052 ALI-ABA 23.
6s See, e.g., Jerry W. Markham, Banking Regulation: Its History and Future, 4 N.C. BANKING
INST. 221, 274 (2000).
6 See id.
67 See Vartanian, supra note 3 at 837 (describing early efforts by Progressive to underwrite auto
insurance risks and issue binders in minutes over the Internet); Markham, supra note 64, at 275
("Allstate Insurance Company announced in November of 1999 that it would be seling car and home
insurance directly to consumers through the Internet and over the telephone."); Freeman & Eggert,
supra note 1 at 420 ("With the development of the Internet and e-commerce, many insurance
companies anticipate soliciting potential policyholders online directly through their properly licensed
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that sell directly to the public using exclusive agents or their own employees, for
example, by telephone or via the Internet.6"
One commentator explained the cost advantages that direct writers gained by
"cutting out the middleman" and utilizing mass media, including telephones, to
issue policies:
"Agency system insurers" have traditionally solicited business through
intermediaries, such as company agency forces, independent agents, managing
general agents, and brokers. Intermediaries typically earn commissions that are
charged to the insurer at policy inception as "acquisition costs." These costs
typically constitute a significant portion of an agency system insurer's policy
expenses. "Direct writers," in contrast to agency system insurers, mass-market and
issue policies directly to insureds (through mass media such as television,
telephone, and the mail) without the use of intermediaries.6 9
In addition to cost factors, niche insurance companies such as USAA and
GEICO were able to access specific populations, and "therefore, did not ever really
need independent or exclusive insurance agents to obtain their customers."70 This
was yet another competitive force that gave rise to the trend toward direct writers.
Furthermore, the direct writer system gained a foothold because it was a
speedier way of doing business. For example, "[for many personal lines insurance
transactions, underwriting and policy issuance can occur almost instantaneously
online."7 ' Obviously, telephone transactions provide many of these same speed
advantages.7" As the direct writer system became pervasive, independent insurance
agents expressed concern that they "may be headed the way of the milkman."
73
employees, as order-takers only, with virtually no efforts on the part of those employees to generate that
business.").
6 Vartanian, supra note 3, at 836.69Id. (citations omitted).
70 Freeman & Eggert, supra note 1 at 420-21; see also 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, 878
P.2d 566, 591 (Cal. 1994) (noting that 20th Century Insurance Company "is a direct writer of
insurance, and therefore d[id] not employ or utilize captive or independent agents").
71 Vartanian, supra note 3, at 837; see also John L. Romaker & Virgil B. Prieto, Expectations Lost.
Bank of the West v. Superior Court Places the Fox in Charge of the Henhouse, 29 CAL. W. L. REV.
83, 135 (1992) (noting that insurance policies are purchased over the telephone).
72 Richard T. Choi, Mutual Funds and the Internet Current Industry Practice, the New E-
Signature Law, and Recent SEC Pronouncements, in INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT REGULATION
(2000), LEXIS SF33 ALI-ABA 25, 44-45 (noting that "[i]n today's markets, where speed is a priority,
significant matters often are communicated telephonically,' and that 'business can be transacted as
effectively over the telephone today as it can in paper'").
7 John R Wilke & Leslie Scism, Under the Gun: Insurance Agents Fight an Intrusion by Banks,
But Other Perils Loom, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 1995, at Al. This new trend is not limited to the
insurance industry. Similar technological advancement has spread to every aspect of life. The courts have
also recognized and adopted new technologies. For example, electronic filing is mandatory in the federal
court system and in some state court cases as well. Electronic courtroom displays are becoming more
prevalent. See Samuel H. Solomon & Suzan Flamm, Admissibility ofDigital Exhibits in Litigation, in
ELECTRONIC RECORDS MANAGEMENT AND DIGITAL DISCOVERY: PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
FOR LEGAL, TECHNICAL, AND OPERATIONAL SUCCESS (2006) LEXIS SM057 ALI-ABA 419;
Robert V. Alvarado, Jr. & Mark S. Wapnick, Telephonic Court Appearances: Reduce Litigation Costs
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Congress' enactment of E-SIGN in 2000 was the result of the growth of e-
commerce throughout the United States.74 E-SIGN was enacted in order to
facilitate the uniform use of electronic records and signatures in e-commerce.75 E-
SIGN provides in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any statute, regulation, or other rule of law (other than this
subchapter and subchapter II of this chapter), with respect to any transaction in
or affecting interstate or foreign commerce-
(1) a signature, contract, or other record relating to such transaction may not be
denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in electronic forr,
and
(2) a contract relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity,
or enforceability solely because an electronic signature or electronic record was
used in its formation.76
The Act also provides the following definitions for the terms "electronic" and
"electronic record": "The term "electronic" means relating to technology having
electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic, or similar capabilities
... .The term "electronic record" means a contract or other record created,
generated, sent, communicated, received, or stored by electronic means."77 This
broad definition is technology-neutral and is intended to encompass a wide range
of electronic recordingc, including telephonic recordings as well as any digitally
recorded transaction from the Internet. Commentators have explained that after
the passage of UETA, electronic records became the equivalent of paper records.7"
the Easy Way, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2006, at 34, 34 (discussing status conferences and oral
arguments, which can now be conducted telephonically); Helen W. Gunnarsson, Making an Electronic
Record: Good Reviews for Digital Recording, 94 ILL. BJ., Feb. 2006, at 72, 74 (discussing movement
by Courts across the country from stenographic to digital recording of courtroom proceedings and
increased trustworthiness and reliability being the major benefits of this technological shift and noting
that "U]udges who preside over hearings that are electronically recorded.., give the system high marks.
... [Several judges agree that] the best thing about electronic recording is that it's '100 percent
accurate'-even more so than live court reporters, who are required to pass a test with 98 percent
accuracy to become certified.").
" 145 CONG. REC. S14,881 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1999) (finding that the growth of e-commerce in
the private sector is in the national interest); id. at S14,882 (statement of Sen. Lott that e-commerce "is
a significant driving force behind our nation's robust and expanding economy").
s Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 Stat.
464 (2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections 15 U.S.C) (referring to the public law in its title
as "An Act to facilitate the use of electronic records and signatures in interstate or foreign commerce).
76 15 U.S.C. § 7001(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
7715 U.S.C. § 7006(2) & (4) (2000).
David E. Ewan, John A. Richards & Margo H. K. Tank, It's the Message, Not the Medium!
Electronic Record and Electronic Signature Rules Preserve Existing Focus of the Law on Content, Not
Medium of Recorded Land Title Instruments, 60 BUS. LAW. 1487, 1491 (2005) ("[The Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act, or UETA'] accomplishes this goal by making electronic records ...
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As discussed in more detail in Section IV(C), since the passing of E-SIGN,
courts and administrative agencies have approved insurers' use of voice recordings
as an equivalent to a writing. For example, in 2004, the Office of General Counsel,
representing the view of the New York State Insurance Department, issued an
Official Opinion confirming that."a life insurance agent may have an applicant sign
a life insurance application by the entry of their social security number into an
interactive voice response (IV-R) system using a telephone keypad[." 79 The
Opinion stated that both E-SIGN and New York's Electronic Signature and
Records Act support the "use and acceptance of electronic signatures and electronic
records in commercial transactions, and confirm their legal validity."8
°
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that where
states and the federal government pass legislation on the same subject matter, the
federal law is supreme and the conflicting state law is void."' Therefore, E-SIGN
preempts any state UM/UIM offer/rejection statute to the extent that the statute
purports to invalidate an offer made or stored in electronic form. It is true that the
McCarran-Ferguson Act 2 generally established a form of "inverse preemption,"
letting state law prevail over general federal rules that do not specifically relate to
the business of insurance.8 3 However, Congress specifically intended E-SIGN to
apply to the business of insurance and that E-SIGN would preempt all states laws
to the contrary, noting that "[i]t is the specific intent of the Congress that this
subchapter and subchapter II of this chapter apply to the business ofinsurance."
84
III. A JURISDICTIONAL SUMMARY OF THE UNIFORM ELECTRONIC
TRANSACTIONS ACT AS ADOPTED IN THE STATES
E-SIGN provides a limited scenario through which a State can avoid federal
preemption by either adopting the official version of UETA or by enacting
alternative statutory provisions that are consistent with E-SIGN and that are
technology-neutral.85 The relevant E-SIGN section states:
equivalent to paper records. In short, UETA allows parties to focus on the message they are trying to
convey rather than on the medium in which it is presented.").
7 Electronic Signatures, N.Y. Op. Gen. Counsel No. 04-08-15 (Aug. 18, 2004),
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/ogco2004/rg040815.htn.
'Id.
s' See U.S. CONST. art VI, c. 2; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406
(1819).
81 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2012). Section 2 of the McCarran-Ferguson Act provides: "No Act of
Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the
purpose of regulating the business of insurance... unless such Act specifically relates to the business of
insurance." 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (emphasis added).
" § 1012(b); NAACP v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 296 (7th Cir. 1992).
15 U.S.C. § 7001(i) (2000) (emphasis added).
"s 15 U.S.C. § 7002(a)(1)-(2) (2012). If such alternative statutory provisions are enacted or adopted
after June 30, 2000, they also must make specific reference to E-SIGN. See id. § (a)(2)(B).
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A State statute, regulation, or other rule of law may modify, limit, or supersede
the provisions of section 7001 of this title with respect to State law only if such
statute, regulation, or rule of law-
(1) constitutes an enactment or adoption of the Uniform Electronic Transactions
Act as approved and recommended for enactment in all the States by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1999, except that any
exception to the scope of such Act enacted by a State under section 3(b)(4) of
such Act shall be preempted to the extent such exception is inconsistent with this
subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter, or would not be permitted under
paragraph (2)(A)(ii) of this subsection; or
(2)(A) specifies the alternative procedures or requirements for the use or
acceptance (or both) of electronic records or electronic signatures to establish the
legal effect, validity, or enforceability of contracts or other records, if-
(i) such alternative procedures or requirements are consistent with this subchapter
and subchapter H of this chapter, and
(ii) such alternative procedures or requirements do not require, or accord greater
legal status or effect to, the implementation or application of a specific technology
or technical specification for performing the functions of creating, storing,
generating, receiving, communicating, or authenticating electronic records or
electronic signatures; and
(B) if enacted or adopted after June 30, 2000, makes specific reference to this
chapter."
Consistent with E-SIGN's preemption provision, forty-seven states have
adopted some version of UETA.s7 The remaining three states-Illinois, New York,
8615 U.S.C. § 7002(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
7 See infra Part II1; see also Alabama: ALA_ CODE § 8-1A-1 (Wesdaw though Act 2015-520 of
the 2015 Reg. and 1st Spec- Sess.). Alaska: ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.80.010 (West, Westlaw through
chapters from the 2015 1st Reg. Sess. of the 29th Leg. in effect through August 31, 2015). Arizona:
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7001 (Westlaw through the First Reg. Sess. of the Fifty-Second Leg.).
Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-32-101 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. and 2015 1st Ex.
Sess. of the 90th Arkansas Gen. Assemb.). California: CAL. Cw. CODE § 1633.1 (West, Westlaw
through Ch. 807 of 2015 Reg. Sess. and Ch. 1 of 2015-2016 2nd Ex. Sess.). Colorado: COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 24-71.3-101 (West, Westlaw through the First Reg. Sess. of the 70th Gen. Assemb.).
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-266 (West, Westlaw through the 2015 Reg. Sess. and the
June Spec. Sess.). Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 12A-101 (West, Westlaw through 80 Laws
2015, ch. 193). District of Columbia: D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4901 (West, Westlaw through September
29, 2015). Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 668.50 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 232 (End) of the 2015
First Reg. Sess. and Sp. A Sess. of the Twenty-Fourth Leg.). Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 10-12-1
(West, Westlaw through the Reg. Sess. of the 2015 Legis. Sess.). Hawaii: HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §
489E-1 (West, Westlaw through Act 243 [End] of the 2015 Reg. Sess.). Idaho: IDAHO CODE ANN. §
28-50-101 (West, Westlaw through end of the 2015 First Reg. and First Ex. Sess. of the 63rd Leg.).
Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 26-2-8-101 (West, Westlaw through all 2015 First Reg. Sess. of the
119th Gen. Assemb. Leg.). Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. § 554D.101 (West, Westlaw through end of the
2015 Reg. Sess.). Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16-1601 (West, Westlaw through laws enacted during
the 2015 Reg. Sess.). Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 369.101 (West, Westlaw through the end of
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and Washington-have enacted separate statutes relating to electronic
transactions." A number of states made substantive changes (beyond renumbering
and the like), such that those statutes no longer constitute the official version of
UETA that was approved and recommended by the NCCUSL in 1999.'
the 2015 Reg. Sess.). Louisiana: LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:2601 (Westlaw through the 2015 Reg. Sess. with
Acts effective on or before December 31, 2015). Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 9401
(Westlaw through the 2015 Reg. Sess. of the 127th Leg.). Maryland: MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §
21-101 (West, Westlaw through the 2015 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.). Massachusetts: MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 10G, § 1 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 111 of the 2015 1st Annual Sess.).
Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.831 (West, Westlaw through P.A.2015, No. 159 of the
2015 Reg. Sess., 98th Leg.). Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325L.01 (West, Westlaw through the
end of the 2015 First Spec. Sess.). Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-12-1 (West, Westlaw through
the End of the 2015 Reg. Sess.). Missouri: MO. ANN. STAT. § 432.200 (West, Westlaw through the
end of the 2015 Veto Sess. of the 98th Gen. Assemb.). Montna: MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-18-101
(West, Westlaw through chapters effective July 1, 2015, 2015 Sess.). Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 86-612 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 1st Reg. Sess. of the 104th Leg.). Nevada: NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 719.010 (West, Westlaw through all 2015 legis. effective through June 30, 2015). New
Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 294-E:1 (Westlaw through Chapter 276 (End) of the 2015 Reg.
Sess.). New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A-12-1 (West, Westlaw through laws effective through
L.2015, c. 115 and J.R No. 7.). New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-16-1 (West, Westlaw through
the end of the First Spec. Sess. of the 52nd Leg.). North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 66-311
(West, Westlaw through Chapter 266, excluding 240-241, 246, 258-264, of the 2015 Reg. Sess. of the
Gen. Assemb.). North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 9-16-01 (West, Westlaw through chapter
484 (end) of the 2015 Reg. Sess. of the 64th Legis. Assemb.). Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1306.01 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Files 1 to 26 of the 131st Gen. Assemb.). Oklahoma: OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12a, § 15-101 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 399 (end) of the First Sess. of the 55th
Leg.). Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 84.001 (West, Westlaw current with 2015 Reg. Sess. legis.
effective through Oct. 5, 2015)). Pennsylvania: 73 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2260.101
(West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Ses. Acts 1 to 49). Puerto Rico: P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, § 4081
(West, Westlaw through December 2011). Rhode Island 42 RI. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 42-127.1-1
(West, Westlaw through chapter 285 of the January 2015 sess.). South Carolina S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-
6-10 (West, Westlaw through Acts 1 and 3 of the 2015 sess.). South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
53-12-1 (Westlaw through the 2015 Reg. Sess., Exec. Order 15-1, and Supreme Court Rule 15-16).
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-10-101 (West, Westlaw through end of the 2015 First Reg.
Sess.). Texas: TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 322.001 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2015
Reg. Sess. of the 84th Leg.). Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-4-101 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First
Spec. Sess.). Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 270 (West, Westlaw through the First Sess. of the
2015-2016 Vermont Gen. Assemb.). Virgin Islands: V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 1-101 (West, Westlaw
though Act 7616 of the 2014 Reg. Sess.). Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-479 (West, Westlaw
through End of the 2015 Reg. Sess.). West Virginia: W. VA. CODE ANN. § 39A-1-1 (West, Westlaw
through laws of the 2015 Reg. Sess.). Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. ANN. § 137.11 (West, Westlaw through
2015 Act 60, published Aug. 13, 2015). Wyoming- WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-21-101 (West, Westlaw
through the 2015 Gen. Sess.).
s 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 175/1-101 (West, Wetlaw through P.A- 99-482, with the exception
of P.A. 99-480, of the 2015 Reg. Sess.) (Electronic Commerce Security Act); N.Y. STATE TECH. LAW
§ 301 (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2015, chapters 1 to 367, 369, 383, 392-93, 396, 399, 403, 408-
410) (Electronic Signatures and Records Act); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.34.010 (West, Westlaw
through the 2015 Reg. Sess. and 2015 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Spec. Sess.) (Washington Electronic
Authentication Act).
" Robert A. Wittie 8 Jane K Winn, Electronic Records and Signatures Under the Federal E-
SIGN Legislation and the UETA, 56 BUS. LAW. 293, 329 (2000); Gary E. McClanahan, The
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Although E-SIGN allows states to adopt UETA, a state may not "circumvent
[E-SIGN] through the imposition of nonelectronic delivery methods under
Section 8(b)(2) of [UETA]."e UETA § 8 is a savings provision for laws that
provide for the means of delivering or displaying information and which are not
affected by UETA:
(b) If a law other than this [Act] requires a record (i) to be posted or displayed in
a certain manner, (ii) to be sent, communicated, or transmitted by a specified
method, or (iii) to contain information that is formatted in a certain manner, the
following rules apply:
(1) The record must be posted or displayed in the manner specified in the other
law.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d)(2), the record must be sent,
communicated, or transmitted by the method specified in the other law.
(d) The requirements of this section may not be varied by agreement, but.
(2) a requirement under a law other than this [Act] to send, communicate, or
transmit a record by [first-class mail, postage prepaid] [regular United States
mail], may be varied by agreement to the extent permitted by the other law.91
Thus, states may not use E-SIGN's preemption provision as "a loop-hole that
allows them to replace existing requirements for 'written' records with new mailing
or physical delivery requirements that would make the use of electronic records
impracticable."92 Implicit in 15 U.S.C. § 7002(c) is that "states that have not
adopted official UETA also may not use laws requiring a particular method of
physical delivery to preclude the use of electronic delivery methods."93
These statutes raise interesting questions in the context of UM/UIM written
offer and rejection requirements. How far may a state go in enacting legislation
that requires an offer of UM/UIM coverage to be "delivered" or "displayed" in
visual formats? May a jurisdiction insert an extra requirement into its enactment of
UETA that electronically recorded conversations must be "provided" to the
recipient, or would such a requirement violate E-SIGN's anti-circumvention
clause? For example, Arizona has interpreted its UIM statute to require that
written notice be provided to the insured, such that a recorded phone call did not
Electronic Contract, in HEALTH AND THE INFORMATION AGE: PRIVACY, SECURITY,
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE INTERNET (Dec. 2011), Westlaw AHLA-PAPERS P12050109.
9' 15 U.S.C. § 7002(c).
91 UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 8 (NATL CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE
LAWS 1999) (alterations in original).
9' Wittie &Winn, supra note 88, at 333.
93 Id.
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qualify as a valid offer.94 In a footnote and without analysis, the Arizona Court of
Appeals arguably created a problematic new loop-hole in E-SIGN and Arizona's
Electronic Transactions Act ("AETA"), stating that "[e]ven if the electronic
recording at issue qualifies as a 'writing' in other contexts, neither it nor any other
type of written notice was provided to the insured" where the insured had only
received oral notice.95 Such a requirement could make telephonic or Internet
UM/UIM offerings burdensome and impractical and undermine E-SIGN's
purpose of fostering electronic commerce. Any State-mandated requirement that
violates E-SIGN anti-circumvention clause is likely void ab initio.
In addition, as discussed in the comments to UETA, E-SIGN and its state law
equivalents are "intended to apply to all records and signatures created, used and
stored by any medium which permits the information to be retrieved in perceivable
form."96 Telephonic recordings satisfy this requirement. Based upon the authors'
experience, insurance carriers typically maintain a call recording platform that
records all inbound calls into the carrier as well as select outbound calls. When a
customer calls a carrier's 800 number, the telephone call is routed to a call center.
When the call recording platform is sent a telephone call, data from the carrier's
call routing system triggers a call record that captures meta-data about that
particular call. The system's call logging devices begin to record audio as soon as it
hears sound on the phone circuits associated with the system. The typical
procedure is that the telephone call is then delivered to a customer service
representative. The information for each call record typically includes, among other
items, the telephone number the customer dialed from, the telephone number
called, the date and time of the call as well as the policy number entered by the
customer. In most situations, the customer service representative inputs additional
information in the carrier's quoting system such as the customer's name, the name
of the agent, and when an insurance quote was provided. When the telephone call
is completed, the system is sent a message to close the call record and the call audio
is stored on the call recording device's hard drive.
After a period of time, carriers will archive all call recordings and typically
retain these archives for a period of ten years or more depending on the carrier's
individual retention practices. The call record can be retrieved by inputting
identifying information inputted into the system automatically or manually by the
customer service representative. Most systems, however, do not allow the call
record to be altered or edited. The call record can then be retrieved and reviewed,
for example, if there is a dispute over whether the insured accepted or rejected
UM/UIM coverage or if there is a dispute over the amount of UM/UIM coverage
selected. Clearly, the ability to retrieve and perceive the recorded conversation
satisfies E-SIGN and UETA. In fact, the comments to UETA provide that even
94 See infra Part IV.
" Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Palomera-Ruiz, 231 P.3d 384, 387 n.2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010)
(emphasis added).6 UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 2, cmt. 4 (emphasis added).
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audio and video tape recordings constitute electronic records.97 In light of the clear
statutory language and legislative history, digital recording of telephone calls should
be given legal effect similar to the legal effect given to audio and video tape
recordings.
IV. EXAMPLES
Notwithstanding the broad reach of E-SIGN and UETA, only a few
jurisdictions have addressed these Acts within the context of UM/UIM insurance
coverage offerings. The Arizona Court of Appeals found that Arizona's mandatory
written offer requirement for UM/UIM coverage was not in any way displaced by
E-SIGN or Arizona's version of UETA,98 ignoring federal preemption. On the
other hand, the New Mexico Supreme Court specifically acknowledged E-SIGN
and UETA as potentially applicable in the UM/UIM context, but found that the
digitally recorded transaction did not comply with New Mexico's mandatory
UMvI/UIM rejection statute because the insured's digitally recorded rejection was
not attached, physically, to the policy as required by New Mexico statute.9 New
Mexico's UM/UIM rejection statute is different from Arizona's statute in that it
contains a requirement of physical attachment that was not addressed in E-SIGN
or UETA.' ° Finally, the Idaho Legislature expressly recognized E-SIGN and
UETA in the UM/UIM context and specifically stated the application of both are
applicable to UMIUIM offerings within the UM/UIM offering statute. 10 ' Each of
these approaches is discussed below, though ultimately, the Idaho legislative
approach should be the standard used by state legislatures to avoid any question
regarding federal preemption.
A. Arizona
97An "electronic record" is
a subset of the broader defined term "record." It is any record created, used or stored in a
medium other than paper (see definition of electronic).... Accordingly information stored
on a computer hard drive or floppy disc, facsimiles, voice mail messages, messages on a
telephone answering machine, audio and video tape recordings, among other records, all
would be electronic records under this Act.
UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 2, cmt. 6 (emphasis added).
98 See generally Palomera -Ruiz, 231 P.3d 384.
"9Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 245 P.3d 1214, 1223-24 (N.M. 2010).
100 Compare N.M. CODE R. 13.12.3.9 (2015), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-259.01
(Westlaw current through the First Reg. Sess. of the 52nd Leg.).
1o1 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-2502(2) (West, Westlaw current through the end of the 2015 First
Reg. and F rst Ex. Sess. of the 63rd Leg.).
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Arizona's UM/UIM offer statute is section 20-259.01(B) of the Arizona
Revised Statutes. 2 A 1981 amendment to the statute originally required that
insurers offer UV/UIM coverage by written notice.'0 3 Section 20-259.01 of the
Arizona Revised Statutes has had a written notice requirement in one form or
another for nearly thiry-fiye years. The Arizona Supreme Court determined that the
intent of the legislature in enacting this section was "to guarantee that responsible
drivers will have an opportunity to protect themselves and their loved ones as they
would others."0 4 This intent requires "that all persons who purchase automobile
liability insurance be offered in writing the option to purchase additional ... UIM
coverage in limits up to those they choose for their bodily injury liability coverage."'
05
The insurer must "offer such coverage in a way reasonably calculated to bring to the
insured's attention that which is being offered. "' °6 Arizona's UMV/UIM statute does
not require insurers to explain UM/UIM coverage to insureds."°7 Instead, "the
insurer need only make the written offer."' °8 "A.R.S. § 20-259.01 further requires
102 It provides, in part, that
Every insurer writing automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policies shall also make
available to the named insured thereunder and shall by written notice offer the insured and at
the request of the insured shall include within the policy underinsured motorist coverage
which extends to and covers all persons insured under the policy, in limits not less than the
liability limits for bodily injury or death contained within the policy.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-259.01(B) (Westlaw) (emphasis added).
103 Joel DeCiancio, Note, S.B. 1445-The Legislature's Attempt to Reverse Judicial Treatment of
Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverage in Arizona, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 469, 472 (1998) (discussing
the history of UM/UIM insurance in Arizona); see also Tallent v. Nat'l Gen. Ins. Co., 903 P.2d 612, 619
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (Toci, J., dissenting) (quoting the statute's language as it existed at the time).
"04 Ball v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 888 P.2d 1311, 1314 (Ariz. 1995) (quoting Ormsbee v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 859 P.2d 732, 735 (Ariz. 1993)).
" State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ash, 888 P.2d 1354, 1359 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); see also
DeCiancio, supra note 102, at 484-85 ("With the mandatory offer intact, the courts will likely hold that the
legislature targeted these coverages so that consumers could make informed decisions on whether to
purchase, and in what amounts, protection for their families against irresponsible drivers.").
See Giley v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 812 P.2d 1124, 1124 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991).
107 Tallent v. Nat'l Gen. Ins. Co., 915 P.2d 665, 666 (Ariz. 1996) (en banc). Unlike Arizona's
UM/UIM statute, statutes in some other states require that insurers explain the nature of UM/UIM
coverage to their policyholders. See, e.g., Mollena v. Ftreman's Fund Ins. Co. of Haw., 816 P.2d 968,
971 (Haw. 1991); Hastings v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 318 N.W.2d 849, 851-53 (Minn. 1982); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wannamaker, 354 S.E.2d 555, 556 (S.C. 1987). Some other jurisdictions
also require that the insured expressly reject UIJ/UIM coverage. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 32-7-23(a)
(Westlaw current through Act 2015-559 of the 2015 Reg., First Spec. and Second Spec. Sess.); IND.
CODE ANN. § 27-7-5-2 (West, Westlaw current through 2015 First Reg. Sess. of the 119th Gen.
Assemb. legis.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3636(G) (West, Wesdaw current through Ch. 399 (End)
of the First Sess. of the 55th Leg.). Some jurisdictions require that the insurer make the offer of UIM
coverage on a form that is pre-approved by the state Department of Insurance. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 627.727(1) (West, Westlaw current through the 2015 Reg. Sess. and Spec. A Sess. of the
Twenty-Fourth Leg.); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 60-2.2 (2015) (supplementary
UM/UIM coverage notice must include the exact illustrative examples set forth in regulation).10 Ash, 888 P.2d at 1360.
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an insurer to provide an applicant with a selection form containing the written
notice and offer of the two coverages [UM and UIM].""
In a case decided in 1995, before the Internet was pervasive and before
Congress enacted E-SIGN, the Arizona Supreme Court held that the written
notice requirement "is the only sure and uniform way to avoid credibility contests
over whether such an offer was actually made.""' Thus, the purpose of the written
offer requirement is simply to ensure that the offer is made. When an insurer utilizes
an electronic record, there is no credibility contest because the written notice (in the
form of the electronic record whether via a telephonic recording or via the Internet)
proves that the insurer made the necessary UM/UIM offer to the insured.
In a leading Arizona case, the Arizona Court of Appeals determined whether a
recording of a telephone conversation concerning uninsured motorist coverage
constituted written notice as required by state law.'' In Palomera-Ruiz, the
president of a business sought a quote for a commercial insurance policy with
Progressive Insurance Company ("Progressive") over a recorded phone call." 2 The
insured initially requested one million dollars in UM and UIM coverage." 3
However, as an effort to reduce the company's six-month policy premium, the
insured elected to reduce the one million dollar coverage to one hundred
thousand." 4 The insured, however, elected to keep the liability limits of one million
dollars. The insured procured the commercial policy and continued to renew the
UM/UIM coverage at one hundred thousand dollars.' Five years after the
commercial policy was procured, Jose Palomera-Ruiz ("Palomera-Ruiz") sustained
fatal injuries following an accident while sitting as a passenger in the insured's
company's utility van." 6 At the trial court during coverage litigation over the
amount of UM/UIM coverage available, Palomera-Ruiz's estate challenged
whether the telephone conversation with Progressive's agent and the insured
constituted a written offer of UM/UIM coverage as required by Arizona law." 7
109 See Ariz. Dep't of Ins., Regulatory Bulletin 2003-10 (July 15, 2003). The 2003 amendment to
the A.-RS. § 20-259.01 added a sentence stating: "The completion of such form is not required where
the insured purchases such coverage in an amount equal to the limits for the bodily injury or death
contained in the policy." H.B. 2151, 46th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2003). The phrase "such form"
refers to the sample form provided by the Arizona Department of Insurance ("DO"). The DOI form is
merely an exemplar. Insurers are free to use their own form, or to use no form at all. Indeed, the July 15,
2003 regulatory bulletin even uses the words "sample form" when referring to the DOI exemplar. Ariz.
Dep't of Ins., Regulatory Bulletin 2003-10 (July 15, 2003).
"1 Ball v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 888 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Ariz. 1995) (en banc).
Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Palomera-Ruiz, 231 P.3d 384, 388 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010).
112 Id. at 385. The insured sought a commercial liability policy for his company Giant Electric
Corporation ("Giant"). Id.
113 Id.
114 See id. at 386.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 386.
117 Id.; see also discussion regarding Arizona UM/IUM requirements infra Part I. Palomera-Ruiz's
estate challenged the validity of the written offer because in many states, the failure of an insurer to
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The trial court concluded that the telephonic conversation failed to meet the
requirements.118
The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. 9 The court
rejected Progressive's argument that the statute's written notice requirement should
be interpreted liberally, and thus, a telephonic conversation satisfied the intent of
the statute.' ° Accordingly, because there was nothing in the legislative history of
the Uninsured Motorist Act that supported the legislative intent that the term
"written notice" require something other than actual notice, the court held that the
plain meaning of "written notice" required that the offer be communicated in
writing and that Progressive failed in providing written notice of the UM/UIM
offer.'21 As a result, the full liability limit of the policy was available as UM/UIM
coverage notwithstanding the insured's digitally recorded verbal selection of lower
UM/UIM coverage 122
Prior to the Palomera-Ruiz decision there was never a requirement in Arizona's
UM/UIM statute that the insurer physically "provide" the consumer with a
contemporaneously retainable copy of the UM/UIM offer. The operative verb in
Arizona's UM/UIM statute is "offer," not "provide".'23 The Arizona Supreme
Court had previously held that the meaning of "offer" in the UM/UIM statute was
"[t]o bring to or before; to present for acceptance or rejection; to hold out or
proffer, to make a proposal to; to exhibit something that may be taken or received
or not."' 24 This is exactly what Progressive did during the telephone call with the
insured in Palomera-Ruiz.
provide a written offer results in the UM/UIM coverage being imputed into the insured's policy with
limits equal to the liability limits. See Warford v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 860, 862
(8th Cit. 1995); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Santa Cruz, 800 P.2d 585, 588 (Ariz. 1990); Shelter Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Bough, 834 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Ark. 1992); Thompson v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., 940 P.2d 987,
990 (Colo. App. 1996) (citing, among other cases, Moon v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 764 P.2d 1331(Okla.
1988)); see also Plitt, supra note 5, at 43. Thus, if the telephonic conversation failed to meet the
statutory requirements of "written offer," the commercial policy would include one million dollars in
UM/UIM coverage as opposed to one hundred thousand.
... Palomera-Ruiz, 231 P.3d at 386.
119 Id. at 388.
'z Id. at 387-88.
121 Id. Additionally, the court highlighted how the Legislature repeatedly amended the Arizona
UM/UIM statute, with each amendment leaving the "written notice" section unchanged. Id. at 388; see
also Sawyer v. Mills, 295 S.W.3d 79 (Ky. 2009) (holding that an employer's recorded promise of paying
employee a lump sum working bonus of $1,065,00 failed to meet the writing and signature requirement
for purposes of the statute of frauds and that although a recorded conversation may be electronic under
E-SIGN, the employer's voice did not constitute an electronic signature for lack of intent to sign the
record).
"2 Paomera-Ruiz, 231 P.3d at 388.
123 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-259.01(B) (Westlaw through First Reg. Sess. of the Fifty-Second
Leg.) (requiring that an insurer "shall by written notice offer the insured" UM/UIM coverage up to the
liability limits).
124 Tallent v. Nat'l Gen. Ins. Co., 915 P.2d 665, 666-67 (Ariz. 1996) (en banc) (quoting BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1081 (6th ed. 1990)); cf JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.11
(revised ed. 1993) ("An offer is an expression by one party of assent to certain definite terms, provided
that the other party involved in the bargaining transaction will likewise express assent to the same
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The Arizona courts circumvented E-SIGN by judicially inserting a new
requirement-one not included in the UMI/ULIM statute-that Progressive should
have "provided" the proper electronically recorded telephone conversation to Mr.
Thompson. The Arizona court's additional requirement is contrary to 15 U.S.C.
§ 7002(c) because this newly-created physical delivery requirement is being used by
Arizona to limit, preclude, or negate proper electronic transactions. Furthermore,
properly interpreted, UETA, like E-SIGN, preempts all state laws that purport to
require a writing. Arizona's AETA provides in relevant part:
A. A record or signature in electronic form cannot be denied legal effect and
enforceability solely because the record or signature is in electronic form.
B. A contract formed by an electronic record cannot be denied legal effect and
enforceability solely because an electronic record was used in its formation.
C. An electronic record satisfies anylawthat requires a record to be in writing."
AETA's definition of "electronic record" and "electronic" are nearly identical to
E-SIGN's definitions.'26 Under these broad definitions, the recorded phone call in
Palomera-Ruiz was clearly "electronic." To further clarify the matter, Comment 4
to section 2 of UETA explains that "electronic" includes biological, chemical, as
well as electromagnetic media."7 Comment 6 to section 2 of UETA also provides
that even audio and video tape recordings constitute electronic records.
128
terms."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (AM. L. INST. 1981) ("An offer is the
manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in
understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.").
t' ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7007 (Westlaw current through First Reg. Sess. of the Fifty-
Second Leg.) (emphasis added).
126 Compare § 44-7002(5) & (7) (Westlaw current through First Reg. Sess. of the Fifty-Second
Leg.), with 15 U.S.C. § 7006(2) & (4) (2012) (defining "electronic" and "electronic record" in a virtually
verbatim manner in both statutes).
127 The comment states:
While not all technologies listed [in UETA § 2] are technically "electronic" in nature (e.g.,
optical fiber technology), the term "electronic" is the most descriptive term available to
describe the majority of current technologies. For example, the development of biological and
chemical processes for communication and storage of data, while not specifically mentioned
in the definition, are included within the technical definition because such processes operate
on electromagnetic impulses. However, whether a particular technology may be characterized
as technically "electronic," i.e., operates on electromagnetic impulses, should not be
determinative of whether records and signatures created, used and stored by means of a
particular technology are covered by this Act This Act is intended to apply to all records and
signatures created, used and stored by any medium which permits the information to be
retrieved in perceivable form.
UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT, § 2, cmt. 4 (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS 1999) (emphasis added).
12 In its relevant part, it reads:
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In addition, the Arizona Legislature stated that AETA should be construed
and applied to:
1. Facilitate electronic transactions consistent with other applicable law.
2. Be consistent with reasonable practices concerning electronic transactions and
with the continued expansion of those practices.
3. Effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of this state with
respect to the subject of this chapter for intrastate, interstate and international
transactions. 29
Thus, AETA is similar to and consistent with E-SIGN. Rather than modifying
each and every statute in Arizona containing an "in writing" or "written"
requirement, the Arizona Legislature enacted a statute that had a global effect on
and modified all Arizona laws, including section 20-259.01(B) of the Arizona
Revised Statutes.' 3 The Arizona Legislature wanted all Arizona laws to reflect the
digital age and allow for electronic transactions, including telephonic and internet
transactions. AETA provides that "an electronic record satisfies any law that
requires a record to be in writing.
" t 31
Importantly, the Arizona Legislature could have exempted Arizona's UM/UIM
statute from the scope of AETA, but it chose not to. Section 3 of UETA lists three
specific areas of law that are exempt from its scope and allows States that adopt the
model act to exempt other laws as well.' 32 However, the Arizona Legislature
6. "Electronic record." An electronic record is a subset of the broader defined term "record."
It is any record created, used or stored in a medium other than paper (see definition of
electronic) ....
Accordingly information stored on a computer hard drive or floppy disc, facsimiles, voice
mail messages, messages on a telephone answering machine, audio and video tape recordings,
among other records, all would be electronic records under this Act
Id., cmt. 6 (emphasis added).
129 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7006 (Westlaw current through First Reg. Sess. of the Fifty-
Second Leg.). "'Electronic record' means a record that is created, generated, sent, communicated,
received or stored by electronic means." Id. § 44-7002(7). "'Electronic' means relating to technology that
has electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical or electromagnetic capabilities or similar capabilities."
Id. § 44-7002(5).
130 See id. § 44-7006(1).
131 Id. § 44-7007(C) (emphasis added).
132 The Act provides in pertinent part:
(b) This [Act] does not apply to a transaction to the extent it is governed by:.
(1) a law governing the creation and execution of wills, codicils, or testamentary trusts;
(2) [The Uniform Commercial Code other than Sections 1-107 and 1-206, Article 2, and
Artide 2A];
(3) [the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act]; and
(4) [otherlaws, if any, identified by State].
UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT, § 3 (emphasis added).
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enacted only the first two exceptions and declined to create new exceptions,
including declining to adopt a specific exception for the UM/UIM statute.'33 The
legislature's decision to allow for only two exceptions implied that AETA does
apply to Arizona's UM/UIM statute.
Consequently, both E-SIGN and AETA invalidate section 20-259.01(B) of
the Arizona Revised Statutes to the extent that section 20-259.01(B) purports to
require an offer of UM/UIM coverage in paper form. 34 The Prefatory Notes to
UETA lend support for the proposition that the electronic offer made to Giant
Electric in Palomera-Ruiz should have been given legal effect:
The need for certainty as to the scope and applicability of this Act is critical, and
makes any sort of a broad, general exception based on notions of inconsistency
with existing writing and signature requirements unwise at best. The uncertainty
inherent in leaving the applicability of the Act to judicial construction of this Act
with other laws is unacceptable if electronic transactions are to be facilitated.13'
The Arizona Court of Appeals' decision is contrary to the foregoing expression
of legislative intent and, by extension, contrary to the intent of Congress in
allowing states to avoid preemption by adopting UETA. Rather than modifying
each and every statute containing an "in writing" or "written" requirement,
Congress enacted E-SIGN and allowed states to adopt UETA (or alternative
statutes consistent with E-SIGN) in order to achieve a uniform global effect on
and modification of all state and federal laws, including statutes like section 20-
259.01(B).' 3 6 Consequently, the UM/UIM written offer requirement under
133 See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7003(B) (Westlaw current through First Reg. Sess. of the
Fifty-Second Leg.).
134 Similar to LJTI\/UM offer/rejection statutes, states have enacted statutes of frauds that also
contain an "in writing" requirement. See, e.g., id. § 44-101. The statute of frauds requires that certain
enumerated agreements or promises be in writing and signed by the party charged. Some jurisdictions
have addressed whether an electronic recording of a telephonic conversation constitutes a "writing" for
the purposes of the statute of frauds. Several have held that a tape recorded conversation satisfies the
statute of frauds. See, e.g., Londono v. City of Gainesville, 768 F.2d 1223, 1227-28 n.4 (11th Cir.
1985) ("[T]he tape recording of the City Commission's action at the meeting satisfies the statute of
frauds requirement of a signed writing."); Ellis Canning Co. v. Bernstein, 348 F. Supp. 1212, 1228 (D.
Colo. 1972) (holding that tape recorded oral contract satisfied "writing" requirement of statute of
frauds); Friedman v. Clark, 248 A.2d 867, 870 (Md. 1969) ("[Tjestimony recorded in open court will,
under appropriate circumstances, take the case out of the Statute [of frauds]."); cf People v. Avila, 770
P.2d 1330, 1332 (Colo. App. 1988) (finding recording on computer disk was a "writing" for purposes
for forgery statute). Although not directly applicable, the statute of frauds also lends support for the
contention that the electronic recording of an IJMIUM offer satisfies the "writing requirement" of
UM/UIM offer/rejection statute and should be given legal effect.
.3 UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTIONS ACT, Prefatory Note (A).
136 See 146 CONG. REC. S5,224 (daily ed. June 15, 2000) (statement of Sen. Abraham) ("[T]he
central purpose of this legislation is to establish a nation-wide baseline for the legal certainty of
electronic signatures and records.... I believe that the eventual adoption of UETA by all 50 states in a
manner consistent with the version reported by NCCUSL will provide the same national uniformity
which is established in the Federal legislation."); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7006(3)
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Arizona law can be made and/or stored by electronic means because it still satisfies
the statute's requirement of evidence that the insured accepted or rejected
UM/UIM coverage. To the extent the Arizona courts impermissibly legislated a
judicial exception for Arizona's UM/UIM statute, A-ETA is not the official version
of UETA and is preempted by virtue of 15 U.S.C. § 7002(a)(1).
13 7
The United States Supreme Court has never examined the degree to which E-
SIGN preempts non-conforming versions of UETA such as AETA, or more
particularly, whether E-SIGN preempts such statutes in whole or only in part.'38
Indeed, E-SIGN's highly unusual preemption scheme has been a source of
confusion for courts and commentators alike.
139
B. New Mexico
The New Mexico Supreme Court addressed electronic signatures and the
requirement of a signed writing in the context of UM/UIM coverage offerings in
(Westlaw through the First Reg. Sess. of the Fifty-Second Leg.) (stating that AETA should be
construed and applied to "make uniform the law of this state"); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7007(C)
(Westlaw) (providing that "an electronic record satisfies any law that requires a record to be in writing.")
(emphasis added).
137 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984) ("The
judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative
constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent. If a court, employing traditional tools of
statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that
intention is the law and must be given effect." (citations omitted)).
" After the Arizona Supreme Cour denied review of the lower court's decision in Progressive
Casualty Insurance Co. v. Palomera-Ruizz 231 P.3d 384 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010), Progressive filed a
petition for writ of certiorari seeking to raise this issue in the United States Supreme Court. See Petition
for Writ of Certiorari at i, Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Palomera-Ruiz, 2011 WL 291137 (Jan. 14,
2011) (No. 10-963). The Supreme Court denied Progressive's Petition. See Palomera-Ruiz, 231 P.3d
384, cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2874 (U.S. May 2, 2011) (No. 10-963).
139 See, e.g., Naldi v. Gnmberg, 908 N.Y.S.2d 639, 649 n-13 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) ("Determining
which law [E-SIGN or New York's Electronic Signature and Records Act] applies to particular
transactions has caused confusion in the business community and thereby has an inhibiting effect on the
expansion of electronic commerce in New York.") (emphasis added) (citing S. Mem. in Support of S.B.
7289A, Ch. 314, 2002 McKinney's Session Laws of N.Y., at 1881); Matthew G. Dore, Preemption
Questions Relating to E-SIGN and IUETA, 6 IOWA. PRAC. § 33:26, Westlaw (database updated
2015) ("[T]here are obvious questions [about] whether [Iowa's adoption of UETA] is preempted in
whole or in part. E-Sign includes an express provision regarding preemption that makes this analysis
particularly difficult") (emphasis added); Wittie & Winn, supra note 91 at 340 ("[T]he complex and
ambiguous preemption rules in E-SIGN are likely to remain a source of confusion for some time for the
state and federal agencies that are subject to them.") (emphasis added); Jamie A. Splinter, Comment,
Does E-SIGN Preempt the Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act?, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 129, 160
(2002) ("[Tlhere is uncertainty about whether P court will find the Illinois Act preempted by E-SIGN.")
(emphasis added).
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Jordan v. Allstate Insurance."4° The court in Jordan held that the selection of
insurance coverage from "pull-down menus" on a website does qualify as a written
rejection of UM/JIM coverage. 141 In Jordan,
Diana Lucero purchased her insurance through Progressive Halcyon Insurance
Company's ["Progressive Halcyon"] website. Progressive Halcyon's website use[d]
customer-entered information to suggest an insurance package, which the
customer could alter using "pull-down menus." In her online application, Diane
Lucero clicked on liability limits of $50,000 per person. While Progressive
Halcyon's suggested packages provide[ing] default UM/UIM coverage equal to
the liability limits, customers [could] purchase lesser amounts of UM/TIM
coverage by using a pull-down menu. Diana Lucero [selected and] clicked on the
minimum amount of UMIM coverage available, $25,000 per person. 42
Some time after the policy was purchased, "Consuelo Lucero, who was covered
by the Progressive Halcyon policy, was injured in an accident with an underinsured
motorist. Progressive paid Consuelo Lucero $50,000 in UM/UIM benefits,
computed by stacking $25,000 for each of three cars, from which the other driver's
$25,000 policy coverage was deducted.
" 143
Under New Mexico law, "[t]he named insured shall have the right to reject
uninsured motorist coverage.""4 In addition, "[t]he rejection of the provisions
covering damage caused by an uninsured or unknown motor vehicle as required in
writing by the provisions of Section 66-5-301 NMSA 1978 must be endorsed,
attached, stamped or otherwise made a part of the policy of bodily injury and
property damage insurance." 45 In making its decision in Jordan, the New Mexico
Supreme Court explained the import of the foregoing requirements as follows:
UM/UIM coverage equal to the liability limits is the default coverage unless an
insurer (1) offers the insured UM/UIM coverage equal to the policy's liability
limits, (2) provides premium costs corresponding to the available levels of
UM/UIM coverage, (3) obtains a written rejection of UM/UIM coverage equal to
the liability limits, and (4) makes that rejection a part of the policy that is
delivered to the insured. 146
The Jordan court concluded that this constituted a rejection of coverage in
writing, "recognizing that in the twenty-first century actively selecting an amount
'Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 245 P.3d 1214 (N.M. 2010).
141 Id. at 1224.
'42 Id. at 1218.
141 Id. at 1219.
14 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-301(C) (West, Westlaw current through the end of the First Spec.
Sess. of the 52nd Leg.).
145 N.M. CODE R. § 13.12.3.9 (2015) (emphasis added).
'"Jordan, 245 P.3d at 1223 (emphasis added).
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of UM/UIM coverage on an insurance website constitutes a 'writing. " 4 The
Jordan court praised Progressive Halcyon for its "commendable system of offering
meaningful choices to its insureds."'" Nevertheless, the Court held that full
compliance with the requirements of the law was not achieved and that the
attempted rejection of coverage was invalid because Diana Lucero's rejection was
not "endorsed, attached, stamped or otherwise made a part of the policy" as
required by Regulation 13.12.3.9 of the New Mexico Administrative Code. 49
More significantly for present purposes, the New Mexico Supreme Court failed to
address E-SIGN or federal preemption, offering only the following explanation:
Progressive points to the short paragraph at the end of its forty-nine page fine-
print policy, which "expressly integrated" the insured's application and
declarations pages into the policy. Incorporating an on-line application into an
insurance policy via buried language toward the end of a generic forty-nine page
policy does not allow for meaningful reconsideration of the decision to reject
coverage. Insureds are only bound to make such examination of such documents
as would be reasonable under the circumstances.... Nothing in the application,
declarations pages, or policy provided Diana Lucero evidence of her rejection for
later reference or reflection. Furthermore, it is not established in the record before
us whether Progressive Halcyon actually delivered the policy and declarations
pages to the insured. Progressive Halcyon should have delivered a policy that
expressly alerted Ms. Lucero to the fact that she had rejected a portion of the
UM/UIM coverage to which she was entitled.5s
C. Idaho
Idaho is the only state that specifically enacted a UM/UIM statute that allows
for an electronic rejection of an offer to the insured.' The relevant statute, Section
41-2502 of the Idaho Code, provides in pertinent part:
(2) A named insured shall have the right to reject either or both uninsured
motorist coverage or underinsured motorist coverage, which rejection must be in
writing or in an electronic record as authorized by the uniform electronic
transactions act, chapter 50, title 28, Idaho Code, and such rejection shall be
effective as to all other insureds and named insureds; and after which such
rejected coverage need not be provided in or supplemental to a renewal or
replacement policy issued by the same insurer or an affiliate of that insurer."5 2
When the Idaho Legislature amended its UM/UIM statute in 2008, the Idaho
House Bill contained a statement of purpose, which provided in relevant part:
147 Id. at 1224 (citing Marckstadt v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 228 P.3d 462, 470-71 (N.M. 2009)
(quoting Witing, BLACK'S LAW DIcTnONARY (9th ed. 2009) (a writing is "[a]ny intentional recording
of words that may be viewed or heard with or without mechanical aids")).
148-d.
... Id. at 1224-25 (quoting N.M. CODE § 13.12.3.9).
I d. (citations and quotations omitted).
151 See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-2502 (West, Westlaw current through end of the 2015 First Reg.
and First Ex. Sess. of the 63rd Leg.).
152 Id. (emphasis added).
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This legislation amends Idaho Code (41-2502 and 41-2503) to define the term
"underinsured motorist coverage" and require that certain motor vehicle liability
insurance policies issued in Idaho include underinsured motorist coverage. This
legislation also allows a named insured to reject, in writing or electronically,
underinsured motorist coverage. Finally, this proposal will require the insurance
carrier to provide the named insured a summary statement, approved by the
Director of the Idaho Department of Insurance, explaining uninsured and
underinsured motorist coverages and different forms of underinsured motorist
coverage offered by insurers in Idaho.' 53
The Idaho Legislature's Statement of Purpose, however, gave little insight into
its rationale for specifically modifying its UJM/UIM statute when its version of
UETA would accomplish that as a matter of course. Nevertheless, it appears that
the Idaho Legislature wanted to clearly resolve the issue, especially in light of the
confusing preemption scheme previously discussed.
Accordingly, in the context of UM/UIM coverage selection, electronic records
are a "commendable system" in New Mexico and Idaho, while they are
unenforceable in Arizona. In addition, the decisions of the New Mexico and
Arizona courts are inconsistent in both their results and their reasoning. Further,
both of these states refuse to acknowledge the preemptive effect of E-SIGN on
their respective UM/UIM statutes.
D. Courts and Administrative Agencies
Courts and administrative agencies nationwide have come to conflicting
conclusions regarding the validity and enforceability of electronic records of oral
communications. In In re Marriage of Takusagawa, the Kansas Court of Appeals
held that the statute of frauds did not prevent the enforcement of an oral divorce
settlement, which involved the transfer of interests in land.'54 The court reasoned
that the agreement and the wife's oral assent thereto were recited orally and on the
record in open court:
Kansas' adoption in 2000 of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA),
probably makes Micko's in-court statement the legal equivalent of a written
signature for purposes of the statute of frauds. The record does not disclose the
type of equipment used by the court reporter, but it would be quite rare today for
a court reporter's equipment not to at least require electricity. The UETA deems
records generated by electronic means, including the use of electrical or digital
magnetic capabilities, to be electronic records. The UETA also deems any
electronic sound or symbol "adopted by a person with the intent to sign the
record" to be an "electronic signature." The UETA then provides that when a law
requires a record or a signature to be in writing, an electronic record or signature
will satisfy the law. Thus, assuming that the court reporter's equipment was
153 H.B. 429, 59th Leg., Second Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2008).
4In re Marriage of Takusagawa, 166 P.3d 440, 446-47 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007).
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consistent with modem practice, it would appear that the electronic capture of
Mieko's oral assent that this was the agreement would satisfy the statute of frauds.
No more is needed to show that Mieko made or adopted the agreement.
155
Various administrative agencies have also embraced the validity of oral
communications as electronic records. In response to an inquiry from the
Mississippi Secretary of State, the Mississippi Attorney General issued an opinion
stating "a voice record created or adopted by a perron may conctitute an 'electronic
signature'" under UETA within the context of a computer generated document in
an Internet application. 6 The Nevada Division of Insurance listed its telephone
number as one of the possible "addresses" to which a petitioner may validly submit
a "written request.., by electronic means" for a hearing with the Appeals Panel for
Industrial Insurance.'57 In New York, the Office of General Counsel, representing
the view of the State Insurance Department, issued an official opinion that a life
insurance agent may "have an applicant sign a life insurance application by the
entry of their social security number into an interactive voice response (IVR)
system using a telephone keypad." 15 8 The opinion stated that "[b]oth federal E-
SIGN and [New York's Electronic Signature and Records Act] authorize the use
and acceptance of electronic signatures and electronic records in commercial
transactions, and confirm their legal validity."'59 Likewise, the Attorney General of
Ohio issued an official opinion concluding that "an audio tape recording of a
meeting of a board of township trustees that is created by the township fiscal officer
for the purpose of taking notes to create an accurate record of the meeting ... is a
public record," where the term "record" is statutorily defined to include electronic
records. '60
By contrast, in Sawyer v. Mills, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that the
statute of frauds applied and barred enforcement of an employer's oral agreement to
pay his employee a $1,065,000 bonus. 6' The court held that E-SIGN did not
preempt the statute of frauds' writing requirement, notwithstanding the presence of
an audio tape recording of the subject conversation between the employee and her
us Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Londono v. City of Gainesville, 768 F.2d
1223, 1227-28 n.4 (11th Cit. 1985) ("[T]he tape recording of the City Commission's action at the
meeting satisfies the statute of frauds requirement of a signed writing."); Ellis Canning Co. v. Bernstein,
348 F. Supp. 1212, 1228 (D. Colo. 1972) (holding that tape recorded oral contract satisfied "writing"
requirement of statute of frauds); Friedman v. Clark, 248 A.2d 867, 870 (Md. 1969) (concluding that
"Etlestimony recorded in open court will, under appropriate circumstances, take case out of the Statute
[of frauds]."); c People v. Avila, 770 P.2d 1330, 1332 (Colo. App. 1988) (finding recording on
computer disk was a "writing" for purposes for forgery statute).
156 Voice Record as a Legal Signature Under the Uniform Electronic Transaction Act, Miss. Op.
Att'y Gen. No. 2002-0161, at "1-2 (Apr. 19, 2002).
117 See NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 616B.9916 (2003).
15' Electronic Signatures, N.Y. Op. Gen. Counsel 04-08-15 (Aug. 18, 2004),
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/ogco2004/rg040815.htm.
I59 Id.
'6 Ohio Op. Att'y. Gen. 2-203, at *1-2 (June 16, 2008).
161 Sawyer v. Mills, 295 S.W.3d 79 (Ky. 2009).
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employer. 162 The Supreme Court of Alabama reached a similar result in Parker v.
Williams, holding that the statute of frauds applied to an alleged guarantee of a
loan, despite the fact that the oral agreement was apparently captured on audio
tape. 163 The Alabama court failed to even acknowledge E-SIGN or Alabama's
enactment of UETA.
164
The results in Sawyer and Parker are similar to the Arizona court's refusal to
recognize the validity of electronic records of oral communications in Palomera
Ruiz. As of now, there are no guideposts that provide necessary guidance to
businesses and to courts and agencies at the state and federal level, regarding the
enforceability of electronic records of oral communications.
V. ANALYSIS OF E-SIGN, UETA AND STATE SPECIFIC ETA'S
IN THE UM/UIM COVERAGE OFFERING CONTEXT
It is clear that Congress, in enacting E-SIGN, intended to reverse preempt the
McCarran-Ferguson Act by stating in E-SIGN that it applied to the business of
insurance. This was an effective preemption of state insurance regulatory
requirements. Both E-SIGN and UETA enhance the regulatory purpose behind
requiring either the mandatory offering or rejection of UM/UIM benefits. Under
the various mandatory offering and rejection state statutes there exists an
evidentiary credibility issue as to whether the written offer that was shown to the
insured or the insured's rejection of the coverage needs to be preserved in some
specific form. As an example, in Arizona, the insurance company is only required
to make the mandatory offering in writing. Preservation of the written offer is not
required by statute and therefore can be the subject of credibility contests over
whether the offer was actually made even though it was in writing. This failing
does not usually exist in situations where the insurer utilizes an electronic record
because under E-SIGN and UETA the digital record is usually preserved.
The Comments to UETA indicate that there was a concern about the storage
costs and space needed to store billions of documents of various business
transactions. 165 Accordingly, E-SIGN and UETA were enacted in part to facilitate
the development of electronic systems that will permit the storage of an electronic
equivalent of a written record and at the same time reduce costs and increase
efficiency while ensuring safety of such records.'66 UETA reflects this public policy
by defining "electronic record" as "a record created, generated, sent, communicated,
162 See id. at 87-88.
163 See Parker v. Williams, 977 So. 2d 476, 480-81 (Ala. 2007).
164 See id.
"61 UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTION ACT § 16, cmt. 1 (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS 1999).
'66 Id. (noting that "natural disasters can wreak havoc on the ability to meet legal requirements for
retaining, retrieving and delivering paper instruments.").
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retrieved, or stored by electronic means."'67 Thus, E-SIGN and UETA are
intended apply to any record that would allow the storage of information by any
medium so long as the system permits the information to be retrieved in
perceivable form.16
UETA explicitly acknowledges that electronic systems permit the retention of
digital copies that reflect the integrity of the originals.'69 E-SIGN and UETA,
however, do not address how long such electronic records should be stored. It
makes sense that, notwithstanding any lack of legislative clarity on this issue, states
should adopt the typical principles currently utilized by businesses in storing their
electronic records. Most business have a seven to ten-year retention period. At a
minimum, carriers should be required to retain electronic records of any UM/UIM
offerings for at least seven years. This should allow the retention of any digital
UM/UIM offerings beyond the six-year statute of limitation period that is typical
for any breach of contract claim that the insured may have against the carrier for
failing to offer or incorrectly offering UM/UIM coverages. 70
Even when there is a document preserving the written offer, credibility issues
may still exist as to what was said during the insurance purchase transaction. This
can occur in those jurisdictions that adopt the modem view of the reasonable
expectation doctrine. However, where the purchase transaction is digitally
recorded, like in those situations where the transaction is part of a digitally
recorded telephone conversation, there will be a contemporaneous record of what
actually was stated by the insurer and insured during the transaction to guide in the
application of the reasonable expectation doctrine, if necessary.
In those jurisdictions that require a mandatory rejection, the rejection could also
be preserved as required by E-SIGN and UETA. In jurisdictions like New Mexico,
which require the rejection to be attached to the policy or made part of the policy,
the attachment requirement can be accomplished by an incorporation by reference
with a statement indicating in the policy that a copy of the rejection can be
provided upon request. However, it would be economically impractical to require
the insurer to provide a digital recording of the telephone conversation for each
policy issued. Because under E-SIGN and UETA the digital recording will be
preserved, in those cases where a dispute exists as to whether UM/UIM coverage
was purchased by the insured can be satisfactorily resolved by requiring coverage
unless the insurer can come forward with a digital recording of the rejection.
The benefit of E-SIGN and UETA lies in encouraging digital preservation.
Digital preservation is an enhancement over most state UM/UIM mandatory
offering or rejection statutes because the offer or rejection will be available. Where
167 Id. § 2(7). This is also reflected in the 15 U.S.C, § 7006(4) (2000) definition of electronic record
a, "a contract or other record created, generated, cent, communicated, received, or stored by electronic
means.
'6sUNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTION ACT § 2, cmt. 4.
169 Id. § 16, cmt. 1.
170 See 2 STEVEN PLrIT &JORDAN R PL=Fr, PRACTICAL TOOLS FOR HANDLING INSURANCE
CASES § 11:34, Wesdaw (database updated 2015).
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extrinsic or parol evidence of the transaction is permitted, E-SIGN and UETA can
provide a contemporaneous digitally recorded verbal record for telephonic
transactions of the actual verbal transaction, which will eliminate "he said/she said"
disputes. However, federal preemption does not resolve the mandatory requirement
that the rejection be attached to the actual insurance policy that may be required in
states like New Mexico. E-SIGN and UETA simply do not address the
attachment requirement, allowing for a loophole to exist regarding complete federal
preemption of the subject.
States have approached the implementation of E-SIGN and UETA in different
ways. As an example, on one end of the spectrum is Arizona's attempt to globally
implement its AETA by stating that: "[a]n electronic record satisfies any law that
requires a record to be in writing."' On the other end of the spectrum, Idaho
provides a clearer example of legislative intent by focusing its UM/UMI rejection
law by directly tethering its UM/UIM rejection law to UETA' 72 The Idaho
approach avoids confusion regarding federal preemption.
At the heart of state offering/rejection requirements is the paternalistic goal
that the public at large would want UM/UIM coverage if made aware of the
availability of such coverage. Unlike liability coverage, which protects third parties,
UM/UIM coverage is purchased to protect the insured from third parties who do
not have liability or have purchased low liability limits-usually at state
minimums.'73 Why would an insured protect third parties more than the insured
would protect themselves and their families? This core question becomes even
more resonant when it is understood how cheap and affordable UM/UIM coverage
171 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7007(C) (Westlaw through First Reg. Sess. of the 52nd leg.)
(emphasis added).
'7' IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-2502(2) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2015 First Reg. and
First Ex. Sess. of the 63rd Legis.) ("A named insured shall have the right to reject either or both
uninsured motorist coverage or underinsured motorist coverage, which rejection must be in writing or in
an electronic record as authorized by the uniform electronic transfers act.") (emphasis added).
173 See Wilks v. Manobianco, 352 P.3d. 912 (Ariz. 2015). In Wilks, the insured claimed that the
agent failed to procure UIM coverage that she orally requested. Id. at 914. The insured had previously
procured a policy with State Farm that had UIM and JIM coverage. Id. She left State Farm, procured
another auto policy with another carrier, and then decided to switch back to State Farm again. Id. The
insured informed the agent that she wanted "the exact same coverage that [she] had previously, full
coverage." Id. The agent failed to review the previous coverage and instead filled out a DOI-approved
form such that UIM coverage was rejected, which the insured signed. Id. The agent argued that the
"safe harbor" provision of Arizona's UM/UIM statute, which made the selection or rejection of
UM/UIM coverage valid and applicable to all insureds if an insured signs a DOI-approved form, also
applied to agents and barred any common law negligence claim against the agent. Id. The Arizona
Supreme Court rejected this contention because the statutory language only provided a "safe harbor" to
insurers and not agents. Id. at 915. The court reasoned that the "safe harbor" eliminated any factual
questions of whether the insurer offered JM/UIM coverage and did not bar any factual inquiries related
to other types of alleged negligence or wrongdoing, namely, whether the agent honored the insured's
request for UM/UIM coverage or whether the agent breached a duty to procure UM/IM coverage. Id.
at 915-16. The court also held that any issue regarding comparative fault because the insured failed to
read the DOI-approved form was for the jury to decide. Id. at 916.
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vis-A-vis liability insurance. UM/UIM is underwritten demographically where a flat
rate is charged at a fraction of the cost for liability insurance.'7 4 Written UM UIM
offer/rejection requirements act as a prompt to the consumer during the purchase
of insurance facilitating discussion of what UM/UIM coverage is and its low cost.
When this occurs, the presumption is that the insured would purchase the
coverage. In states like Arizona (mandatory offer in writing) and New Mexico
(mandatory rejection attached to the policy) confirmation proof of the offer is
central to the goal that insureds be informed of UM/UIM coverage increasing the
likelihood of purchase. E-SIGN and UETA complements this goal because the
electronic record preserves the relevant purchase transaction, which is digitally
stored as an "electronic record."
CONCLUSION
The modern insurance purchase is increasingly taking place telephonically or
electronically. Two things need to take place to refine E-SIGN and UETA for
UM/UIM purchases. First, each state should complete Congressional intent for
reverse preemption. Here, the approach of the Idaho State Legislature works best.
For states like Arizona, each state's iteration of a UM/UIM statute should state
that the offer must be in writing "or electronically" made. For states like New
Mexico, the UM/UIM statutes should allow rejection "electronically" with digital
preservation in lieu of physical attachment to the policy. Second, E-SIGN and
UETA should require preservation of the digital record. There should be a specific
preservation time period. A seven-year preservation period should be the minimum
time period utilized. These modifications will substantially advance the public
policy goal of having UM/UIM coverage available for purchase in the modem
digital era.
'74 See, e.g., Maryalene LaPonsie, Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverage,
INSURANCE.COM (Dec- 17, 2015), http://www.insurance.com/auto-insurance/coverage/uninsured-
underinsured-motorist-coverage.html#unisured3 ("UM/IIM insurance costs approximately 5% of your
annual auto insurance premium." ). For obvious reasons an insurance company does not use standard
underwriting information regarding its insured (age, prior accidents, credit scoring, vehicle type) when
underwriting UM/UIM simply because the tortfeasor is unknown at the time the policy is purchased.
Insurers look at the losses that historically have taken place within the demographic area where the
insured's vehicle is garaged.
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